

GBOOK999D

RECOLLECTIONS ABOUT REINHARD GEHLEN

My association with Reinhard Gehlen covered almost three decades. The first eight years were largely in the compound at Pullach which we called Nicolaus. For seven of these years his office and mine were separated by a small, walled-in cobble=stone courtyard where he could observe anyone coming to or leaving my office and I could look down from my second floor office on anyone arriving or leaving his office. For two intelligence officers whose nations had just finished a war as enemies, that was a fairly intimate arrangement -- particularly when you consider Gehlen's proclivity for surrounding his future German intelligence service with some secrecy. I saw Gehlen through good times and bad -- some pretty bad -- to his achievement of becoming the first President of the Intelligence Service of the German Federal Republic which, by then was our full ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization sharing a multitude of top secret. The German Service was founded on 1 April 1956 in one of our bad times. Gehlen's distrust of me was at a peak. Between the, the Soviet KGB and the American CIC had really muddled the waters. And the American Army, which had responded to Gehlen's proposal at the end of the war and supported his effort for three years, had made its own awkward effort in 1955 to persuade Adenauer and his advisors to ditch Gehlen and his organization in favor of starting all over again

with something that would look more like an Army G-2. Gehlen was sure what my role had been in all of this -- in fact there was none -- and was pretty unhappy with the Americans.

There was almost nothing to indicate that 31 March was the last day of CIA's "holding in trust" the Gehlen Organization. There seemed to be no recognition in Nicolaus that the objective had been seized, that the long awaited day was at hand. There was no celebration -- not even a private joint popping of a bottle of Henkel Champagne. I think that Gehlen had not focused on the full implication of the change. I have no recollection that even the German staff alone made much of the event. But I made the decision that the Stars and Stripes that had flown over Nicolaus since 1945 would come down for the last time. The only ceremony marking the day had occurred at eleven o'clock on 31 March when the Finance Ministry in Bonn sent an official to Pullach to reimburse us for DM 2 million we had advanced to the Gehlen Organization to bridge the transition.. He brought a suitcase with DM 2 million which went into Horst Wendlands hands in one room in a kind of escrow arrangement to keep both sides honest. I, in another office, then signed the name of Kent J. Marshall on behalf of the United States Government certifying that I had indeed been reimbursed in full for our earlier advance. We kept the DM 2 million and the Bonn official, without even meeting Kent J. Marshall, returned to Bonn his mission accomplished. That was the only ceremony of which I have any recollection.

My problems with Gehlen were that I found it hard to maintain his trust and that he didn't tolerate easily opinions of others on a lot of issues we had faced together. In time he came to trust me more and to recognize that there had been some merit in positions I had taken on behalf of CIA. In his book "Der Dienst" he went so far as describe a few of the issues on which I prevailed as his idea all along. He had fretted and fumed impatiently for legalization of his service, attacking we Americans for not forcing a decision. But in the end, it was such a wise thing to delay until the Federal Republic was sovereign before the decision to act entirely on its own in forming the BND. There was also the issue of a full separation of internal counterespionage from foreign intelligence. There was an educational process on this issue; nothing in Gehlen's experience had forced him to think this issue through. In the end, he did. And so did Adenauer and the Bundestag.

Gehlen went through some very bad times after my departure. The case of Heinz Felfe, a KGB penetration right in the middle of his own counterespionage. Then there was in internal political flap called "The Spiegel Affair" which put a great strain on his relations with the Chancellor and the Bundestag. In 1968 he visited Washington on the occasion of his retirement. I was eight years into a different assignment as head of CIA's Middle East and South Asian operations and no longer following the development of German intelligence. But I saw Gehlen several

times, participate in the rendering of honor to an Old Cold Warrior and we both went sailing with Ed Petty, a veteran of many years in Pullach, on the Chesapeake. Gehlen, like Petty, had in the interim become an avid sailor. In a letter to an associate written during his Washington visit Gehlen wrote the following lines: "-----

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Gehlen clearly was moving toward the view that maybe I was, after all, probably OK. A few years later his extended family assembled at his home on the Starnbergersee to celebrate his 70th birthday. His secretary of thirty years and I were the only outsiders invited. My stock was still rising. Then in 1974, apropos of nothing at all, there arrived in the mail delivered to my apartment in Washington, a large silver dish with an engraved inscription of my names and "Inerung an langjahriger Zussamenarbit --- December 1974, Reinhard Gehlen." Several years after that my wife and I stopped, on a visit to Europe, to have tea with the Gehlens in Berg. After some minutes he took my arm, pulling me toward the sofa to sit side by side. Tucking his arm under mine, he asked my wife to take our picture in this first ever warmly personal arrangement. Obviously, the distrusted side of my image of the early 1950s was fading.

The last time I saw Gehlen was a few days before his death in 1977. I was flying to the Middle East and broke my trip in

Munich to see him. He was very ill, confined to the bedroom of the small house he constructed in the rear garden of his home at Berg when he retired. He was emaciated, his face drawn and sallow in color. He appeared to be very weak; talking at all was a distinct effort. Mrs. Gehlen was seated in a chair close to the foot of his bed. He managed to carry on a short conversation and then lapsed into what appeared to be a deep sleep, I softly said to Mrs. Gehlen that I would leave. His eyes flickered and one thin hand made a small movement in my direction. One word came from his lips: "Warten," After resting a few minutes more he made an effort to turn his face in my direction and said in barely audible German: "Before you go, I want to thank you for helping me achieve the dream of my life, the Service." I gently pressed down on his outstretched thin hand once and departed. It occurred to me as I drove back toward Munich that this put to rest the debate of earlier years about Gehlen's ambition. A few days later a message reached me that Gehlen had died.

Sometime after the 1 April 1949 founding of the BND, Gehlen had designed a medallion cast in gold showing Saint George slaying the dragon. These were cast and sequentially numbered. I suppose he and Adenauer were the recipients of 1 and 2. They should have been. Wessel and Heusinger would have been my candidates for 3. Dr. Herbert Globke would also have been a contender.

THE SHELTERED EXISTENCE OF A YOUNG GENERAL STAFF OFFICER

Gehlen, on 9 May 1945, was a German officer virtually unknown outside of what remained of the German General staff on the Eastern Front. He had achieved the German rank equivalent to that of a US brigadier general only late in the war. I have found only very rare references to him in the hundreds of postwar books on the Third Reich and the war years. He was an officer who matured in the protected environment of the German General Staff under Ludwig Beck and his successor, Franz Halder. General Beck, in his four years as Chief of the General Staff, met Hitler only once. Halder, the Chief of Staff when Hitler was threatening in 1938 to go into Czechoslovakia, made tangible preparations to violate his officer's oath and remove Hitler from power. Chamberlin's "peace in our time" concession to Hitler at Munich catapulted Hitler to a plateau of popularity with the German people which doomed Halder's plans. That was probably the last real window of opportunity for the General Staff to end Hitler's march into World War II. The solidarity of the General Staff began to crumble as Hitler moved from one easy victory to another in 1939, 1940 and most of 1941. By 1942 when the Russians went on the offensive and America entered the war, it was too late. At Casablanca in early 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill committed their nations to continue the war until German's "unconditional surrender,"

Gehlen was serious, hard-working, well-schooled as a staff officer and personally seen as very efficient by his superiors and colleagues in the General Staff. His isolation within this military structure, removed him from any significant contact with civilian life and the rise of the Nazi party. Like all young professional officers who were commissioned in the Weimar era, he understood that Hitler and his ilk were inferior people that, it had to be admitted, had raised Germany out of its economic chaos and cast off the restraints of Versailles -- two accomplishments that alone commended Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party to German officers of all ages and origins

THE INFLUENCE OF GENERAL FRANZ HALDER

Gehlen, as a proficient, well-trained and presentable staff officer first came under Halder's close supervision and influence starting in 1939 when Gehlen served for a brief period as Halder's aide. After the war, Halder went no further than to say that "Gehlen was one of our best young officers in the General Staff." Halder had closely observed Colonel Gehlen in the three years that Gehlen had worked directly under Adolf Heusinger in the planning and staff supervision of the entire Balkans campaign and the first year of the war against the Soviet Union. Adolf Heusinger, the head of the operations division of the General Staff was, in those years of expanding warfare on the Eastern Front, as close to Halder as anyone in the General Staff. Halder would certainly

have consulted him in reaching the decision, so critical to both Heusinger and Gehlen in the postwar years, to give Gehlen the Fremde Heer Ost job. Halder assigned Colonel Gehlen on 1 April 1942 to become the head of a division of the General Staff, Fremde Heere Ost or Foreign Armies East. The influence of Halder and Heusinger on Gehlen continued, interrupted intermittently, through the war and all of the critical decade after WW II. Through the three years after his assignment to Fremde Heer Ost, even after Halder's break with Hitler in September 1942, Gehlen worked in the shadow of Adolf Heusinger. The products of Gehlen's labor as chief of the intelligence staff were normally presented daily to the Chief of Staff and then integrated into the Chief of Staff's and Heusinger's reports to CINCs on the Eastern Front and, once Hitler had assumed personal command on the Eastern Front, to Hitler and his entourage -- mainly at the Wolfschanze near Angerberg. With Hitler only thirty minutes away at Angersberg during many months of the war on the Eastern Front, it is significant that Gehlen was present at meetings with him only three or four times.

THE PERFORMANCE OF FREMDE HEERE OST UNDER GEHLEN

I am not, in this book, making any effort to assess the performance of Fremde Heere Ost, the German G-2 staff on the Eastern Front in Germany's long war with the Soviet Union. It is not really relevant to the Gehlen story after 1945 beyond the fact

that he had headed Fremde Heere Ost and had gotten consistently good rating from Halder and Heusinger. Scholars and historians of WW II have studied the quality of Fremde Heere Ost production and reporting of intelligence during Gehlen's tenure. The successes and failures of Fremde Heere Ost and Gehlen's personal experiences are, for my purposes, better subject to meaningful analysis when addressed separately. I have, over the years, talked with many officers who were in a position to observe Gehlen and the production of his staff during the period that Gehlen was in charge -- the three years from April 1942 to his relief of that post in April 1945 when the Eastern Front was collapsing. Most agree that Gehlen as a staff officer, was dedicated, innovative, hard-working and efficient and appeared to have the confidence and support of his immediate superiors in the General Staff. All emphasize that providing timely and accurate short term Soviet order of battle and forecasts became increasingly difficult in the deteriorating circumstances on the Eastern Front.

Gehlen, as the German G-2 on the Eastern Front, had at his disposal the reporting of the Abwehr and was particularly dependent on Leitstelle I Ost, the arm of the Abwehr that ran agents to collect intelligence on the Eastern Front. The Abwehr, like the General Staff, established an advanced headquarters in Eastern Prussia which Admiral Canaris, head of the Abwehr until early 1944, sometimes occupied, Gehlen's principal contact in the Abwehr was Herman Baun, a lieutenant colonel at the end of the

war, who was born in Russia of ethnic German parents. Fremde Heer Ost itself conducted no agent operations. For intelligence collected by secret agents, Gehlen relied mainly on Baun's Leitstelle I Ost over which he could exercise no direct control. Baun's commander was Admiral Canaris. Without Baun and the surviving remnants of his wartime espionage organization in postwar Germany, there might well have been no Gehlen Organization in the decade after the end of WW II. What G-2 USFET wanted by 1946 was information on Soviet units in East Germany. Baun could produce these. But the value of the intelligence Baun produced, was significantly enhanced by the evaluations done by Gerhard Wessel's FHA group at Oberuersel.

GEHLEN AND THE 20TH OF JULY 1844

Reinhard Gehlen was not a natural conspirator. And the Gestapo, in the manhunt after the 20th of July, did not seem to regard him as one. He was in a hospital for a period just before and just after the failed effort to kill Hitler. I believe that it is a fact that not one officer in Fremde Heere Ost was either interrogated or arrested after the 20th of July. Heusinger, who was not in Fremde Heer Ost, was standing immediately adjacent to Hitler when bomb exploded, was wounded, hospitalized and immediately arrested and removed to Berlin for interrogation in the Gestapo's prison on Prinz Albrechtstrasse, Heusinger spent some time there along with his friend Hans Speidel. Eventually, both were released. Halder, no longer in an important position,

was also arrested after the 20th of July and narrowly escaped the fate of Admiral Canaris and others who were brutally executed in the final months of Hitler's rule.

Gehlen's colleagues who had served with him in the General Staff in the Mauernwald -- and there were after 1948 many of them in Pullach -- described him, at that time of the plot as apolitical but with an interest mainly in the strategic implications of the way the war was going in the summer of 1944. I have found no real evidence that Gehlen was involved in any way in the 20th of July. I would not have expected him to be. By July 1944 Gehlen was fully convinced that the war was lost and claimed to have tested and found the allied commitment to "unconditional surrender" to be the real thing. His daily focus was still on the advancing enemy. If Gehlen heard in 1944 about a plot against Hitler, he made no effort to involve himself in that particular conspiracy. Within nine months after the 20th of July, Gehlen moved decisively into his own conspiracy, preparing to get his files, his staff and his ideas into the hands of the Americans -- a conspiracy to be played out in the last days of the war. By April 1945, Gehlen was not concerned with Hitler's fate; the Soviet army was approaching Berlin and would deal with Hitler one way or another. But even then Gehlen was uneasy and went to some effort to get at least a shred of legal sanction, somewhat ex post facto, for what he had done and planned to do. General August Winter, the operations officer of OKW at the end of the war, provided Gehlen with a document providing a dubious shred of

legal authority to carry out his plans. Also, Gehlen waited until the last shot had been fired, and then a decent interval of two months to reveal his plan to the enemy. But by then he was technically a POW and Captain John Boker was his interrogator.

In the end, Gehlen's move toward a role in the West became no more than the leading edge in Germany's move into NATO and the Western European Union. Indeed, in 1986 the Bonn government staged a fairly elaborate, although discreet, celebration of forty years of US- German cooperation in international security affair -- the forty years dating from Gehlen's mythical "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Edwin L. Sibert, the then G-2 of the United States Forces in Europe. Since Sibert was dead by then, by some process of elimination, I became the symbolic American speaker at that event.

In his book Gehlen made the statement that "high treason is high treason" and then described the conditions under which it becomes justified -- one of them being a reasonable prospect of success. Those who were involved and fully committed to the plot against Hitler had clearly gone through the agonizing process of weighing the crime of high treason against the crimes of the regime they sought to remove. I was never able to persuade Gehlen to reveal to me his thoughts in these terms. Gehlen never defended, in our conversations, the evil acts of the Third Reich. But I doubt that he ever felt a practical need to place on the balanced scale of justice, the crime of high treason against what

the Tribunal later described as "crimes against peace, crimes against humanity etc..."

THE OATH OF LOYALTY TO ADOLF HITLER

Nothing interested me more in my years of close association with former German officers than their famous oath to Adolf Hitler as a leader -- not an oath to the flag or the nation or the "fatherland" but an oath to an individual who took the nation not only to defeat and destruction but, more costly, to great damage to the reputation and self esteem of the German people. The one secret that for me remains locked up in the psyche of the German officers corps of the Third Reich is why an oath to Hitler. Particularly as the character of his regime became clear, had real meaning.

PLEDGING ALLIANCE TO THE FLAG AND TO THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT STANDS...AN AMERICAN VIEWPOINT

From the age of six I joined my classmates at the opening of school each morning, pledging "my allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands..." I took a comparable oath on becoming a commissioned officer which said more or less the same thing. This carries, of course, the commitment to obey the orders of the Command-in-Chief ... but only up to a point. Defining that point has been and

will continue to be debated in every nation. The issue arises, in democratic countries, with service in the armed forces and in being an intelligence officer in today's world.

I long ago was surprised to discover, that what I will call "patriotism" for want of a better word, has probably been the single strongest and most durable emotion I have experienced as an adult American. I do not think this has been unusual for my generation; it obviously became confused during the Vietnam war. It is a remarkable motivating force. The poetry that was most often quoted in the press as we went off to WW II was the "Ode to Lucretia" by the British romantic poet Richard Lovelace ending with the line "I could not love you dear so much, loved I not honor more." Not everyone who served om WW II shared these romantic sentiments which were, we know, exposed to more severe testing in the course of the Vietnam war. The issue became more complex when, deep into the Cold War, the US Congress addressed the legality of assassination as an option of Americans, particularly intelligence and military personnel actively engaged "in peacetime" in the "Cold War." The question was additionally complicated by the issue of "terrorism" and the expanding range of limited wars including communists moving in on "national wars of liberation."

For a soldier serving in the armed forces of the United States legally at war with the German nation, it was quite uncomplicated. Two men meet in battle, both with a mission and

orders to kill and the means to do so. It was a set scenario. One will die. Neither is asked or permitted to question the morality, the legality or the practicality of the act. On the latter point, the individual soldier is almost never in a position to judge whether a particular act advances the established aims of the nation in going to war. Hesitating to act or deserting in the face of the enemy was in WW II a certain route to a court martial, disgrace, dishonorable discharge, prison and even, as Private Eddie Slavik learned, a death sentence signed by the nation's top soldier, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. In Germany after victory we were far less squeamish about capital punishment, handing out something over 150, most of which were carried out.

In the conflicts since WW II, including the Cold War with its diverse and sporadic conflicts up and down the scale of warfare. the soldier, airman, sailor and intelligence officer has found it necessary to make more individual decisions in a great variety of circumstances. This has been true of the whole gamut of covert operations such as the much publicized Iran-Contra affair. The individual warrior, including the civilian intelligence officer who might have envisaged himself as a warrior, must now more frequently ask himself, for his own protection. the three part question: Is it legal? Is it moral -- and by what standards? Is it likely to accomplish a stated purpose -- and by whose judgement? Experiences in war, my assignments in Heidelberg and Vienna in the first years of the occupation and, above all, a close association over eight years with so many former German

officers, old Abwehr hands and more than a few former members of the SD, had sharpened, as I left Germany at the age of thirty nine; my sensitivities to these issues.

Taking the oath to Hitler in 1934 may have been, as some argue, only one easy step from an oath to the Kaiser. Others argue that it was a pragmatic action to avoid a showdown at the time with a leader who was building a new Germany and throwing off the shackles of Versailles and, in the process, of restoring the self esteem of the German people after the war of 1914-1918. Maintaining to the bitter end an oath to Adolf Hitler, if that in truth was a dominating factor, was and remains incomprehensible, I believe, to most Americans. Since we have never had a monarch and an oath to an individual is ,foreign to our constitutional system in the United States.

I hasten to add that in later long years as the head of CIA operations in the Middle East and South Asia, I acquired a great deal more experience in living with monarchies and a variety of military dictators who, to a man, expected the officers of their armed forces and their intelligence to swear undying loyalty. And most of them did and stuck with it. I found it quite possible to coexist comfortably with most. Admittedly we tried harder to help some of these monarches and dictators more than others and were not entirely adverse, when ordered to do so, to encourage others to move on -- not always with much success, as Gamal abd al Nasser, Qadhafi, Saddam Hussein and others

have demonstrated. Our moral and legal structure remains intact. It is OK to kill an Iraqi in Desert Storm; but an effort to dispose of the Iraqi leaders in the grey area after Desert Storm got the cease-fire, would be quite illegal and might well bring the American officer who called the shot to do so before a "special prosecutor." I leave aside the issues of morality and whether, in practical political terms, it would be a better Middle East without Qadhafi and Saddam Hussein, our favorite villains in the region.

GEHLEN THE PERSON

Reinhard Gehlen was not a man given to conversations about abstract philosophical issues. In all the years I knew him, we never engaged in either casual or serious conversations on cultural interests -- theater, opera, literature, poetry. Indeed, I never heard of Reinhard Gehlen going to the theater or opera. His secretary and special assistant of more than forty years put it very succinctly in a conversation with me in June 1993: "Er war sachlich." This translates as real, to-the-point, business-like, material and relevant. Gehlen was all of the above.

On one occasion in my early years in Pullach, Gehlen proposed we spend several days skiing together and arranged for us to use an Alpine hut of the Bavarian Border Police a short distance from a skiing area known as Sudelfeld near the Austrian border. It snowed heavily for three days and we made no effort to reach the

lift at the Sudelfeld. We ventured out once or twice into the deep snow. At some point in his military training Gehlen had learned the military art of skiing. He demonstrated to me the technique of the telemark turn -- the only time I ever saw it done. The custodian of the hut appeared only to stoke the stove and to supply simply prepared food. Otherwise, we simply talked -- all business related politics and people. It was the only occasion on which I ever saw Gehlen on skis.

During a trip of several weeks around the United States in late 1951 accompanied only by Heinz Herre, we often had long stretches of rail travel. One day when the gregarious Herre was working the fairly luxurious train, Gehlen and I were sitting alone in our compartment watching the majestic Rockies slide by, I ventured into the question of religion. Of course, he said, my opposition to communism is indicative of the fact that I am a religious man. I accepted that as an answer and never touched on it again.

HERTA GEHLEN

Someone who knew the Gehlen family well, described Reinhard Gehlen as "a German father in a German house which implied there were rules, his; they were old-fashioned in a German sense;, and they were followed. I suppose he was a kind of General Staff Officer in his own home. But the offsetting influence of Herta Gehlen was within the family the dominate

influence that shows through in her children and in the character of the family that has emerged as the children have become adults and Herta Gehlen has been left alone to set the matriarchal influence and character of the still closely knit family. I do not see, given the long hours and stresses under which Gehlen existed, how he could have afforded to be other than to-the-point with his children.

Herta Gehlen, the wife of Reinhard Gehlen, in her quiet and happy way, is very openly a devoted and active member of the church. She came of an aristocratic background and it shows. I spent much of a 1993 June day with her and her extended family in Berg, a small village in the Bavarian countryside. The village of is situated perhaps a mile above the Gehlen home closer to the lake. The gathering was at the home of the eldest daughter, Katherina, who in the late 1950s attended Hunter College in New York City and spent her holidays at my home in the Virginia countryside where she became very much a member of my family. Herta Gehlen at the at the age of 89 is a woman who appears to be in remarkably good health, active, poised, well informed and full of humor and out-going grace. Seemingly she enjoys her matriarchal role with all four of her children and their families living within an hour's drive of Berg am Starnbergersee where she continues to live. All who have known her for many years express wonderment at how she seems to be blossoming late in life. I think that living through the turbulent and troubled years with Reinhard Gehlen could not have been an easy life.

AT HOME -- BERG AM STARNBERGERSEE

In my early years in Pullach, Herta Gehlen and her four young children shared the house which also served as Gehlen's quarters and office. After a year or two, I enthusiastically supported the suggestion of his deputy, Horst Wendland, to assist Gehlen in acquiring a home for this family outside of Nicholas. We had established a program to provide housing loans for the resettlement outside of Nicholas of Gehlen and his staff, particularly those with families. Real estate was still undervalued at that time. Purchase of the wooden frame house and the surrounding lot at Berg required a loan of DM 48,000. I never knew whether this covered the entire purchase price. Not long before Gehlen's move to Berg, the owner of the requisitioned house in Solln that I occupied approached me with the offer to sell me this house, which was about the same size and of sturdier construction than Gehlen's new home, for DM 55,000. I was not at all in the market for a German house but the offered price suggested that Gehlen might have acquired his house for something in the same price range. Gehlen insisted that he could handle monthly payments of DM 3000, at that time the equivalent of roughly \$720 a month. This represented a major part of his salary. But he was a man with no visible expensive habits or interests. He and his family had a frugal if not an austere life style. I never knew them to take a vacation; they appeared to spend virtually nothing on recreation or luxuries. The

housing loan was, in any case, fully repaid within two years. The matter was handled routinely and was never a matter of discussion between Gehlen and me until he invited me out to see his new home shortly after moving in.

Gehlen's house was in Berg am Starnbergersee, not far from the home of Prince Albrecht von Wittelsbach, precisely the place made famous in the mysterious drowning of "Mad King Ludwig of Bavaria. When Gehlen retired in 1968 he ordered a small prefab house which was installed on a cement foundation on the same lot and immediately behind the original house. Gehlen and his wife moved into this, turning the principal house over to his son Christoph and his family. It was in this extremely modest house in the rear garden that I saw Gehlen just a few days before his death.

Gehlen's new house was close to but not directly on the water. When I prepared to leave Germany in 1956, Dr. Hans Winter, a hybrid combination of medical doctor and intelligence officer on Gehlen's staff proposed that I sell the boat to Gehlen. His staff, including his medical doctor, had tried unsuccessfully to interest Gehlen in some form of recreation and relaxation. He was not a skier. I never saw him take anything resembling a long walk. He did not even think about golf or tennis. As a young officer he had attended a course for mounted officers and had, I was told, become a quite accomplished equestrian. But I never saw him near a horse although riding clubs were reappearing in much of

Germany.

GEHLEN BECOMES A SAILOR

Soon after my 1948 arrival in Munich I had bought a much used 22 foot, Marconi-rigged, M-class sailboat with a painted canvas-covered deck and a pull-up center-board instead of a keel -- an ideal boat that offered flexibility in getting in and out of various parts of the lake, including the shallow water between the shore and three romantic Roseninsel where Sissy, a Wittelsbach daughter, had as a child spent time on the small island. Later she became the Empress Elizabeth of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as the wife of Franz Josef. These fifteen square meter mainsail of my boat was marked with a huge black M denoting its class. The fact that I signed papers in Pullach with a large M (for Marshall) with a line through it suggested to those uninformed on sailing that I had put a monograph on the boat. I had hauled the boat up from the Traunsee in Austria and kept it for some years at the Starnberg marine and yacht club. I, my children and friends spent hundreds of hours over the years on the twenty kilometer long Starnbergersee which, on a clear day, is within sight of the snow-capped Alps in spring, winter and autumn.

Dr. Hans Winter was a sailor, lived on the opposite side of the lake and further south. He served as my agent in the negotiated sale and said that he would undertake to interest Gehlen in sailing. I sold the boat for DM 700, the equivalent of \$200 at

that time. That is what I had paid for it in Austria Schillings some years earlier. I received the DM 700 from Hans Winter and left the boat where it was in the Starnberg marina. About a year or two later when I visited Gehlen at Berg, he took me down to the lake below his house where the boat was moored. He had become an enthusiastic sailor. I noted a larger, newer and far more complicated boat moored next to my old M class and asked him who was the owner of this beautiful craft. He hesitated for a moment and then, smilingly, as if he were announcing a new high-level recruitment in the Kremlin, told me that it was a recent present from the British. My old M class boat remained in the service of the Gehlen family for many years. It may still be there.

GEHLEN'S INTENSITY OF PURPOSE

Gehlen's one great over-riding quality was his intensity of purpose. Having arrived, by 1944 or even earlier, at his strategic estimate of what the postwar world would look like, Gehlen identified and pursued his own objectives with a stubborn and unrelenting vigor. I am sure this characteristic was deeply rooted in his genes but also reflected something of his own general staff training. When I was a student at the Command and General Staff College at Leavenworth, a British colonel fresh from the North African campaigns of 1942 urged the Command and General Staff class he was addressing to learn and remember above all else a single paragraph he had found in our own

American Field Manual 105-1 ---which reads "The objective of the commander having been determined, all actions which contribute to its attainment will be vigorously pursued; those which do not will be avoided." That adequately describes Gehlen's management of his organization and the conduct of his own efforts in the long decade between his decision late in the war and the birth of the German Intelligence Service in 1956. It was a performance that was sustained; he was always impatient, unforgiving of his opponents and aloof and often less than frank and honest with his colleagues if this maintaining movement toward his end objective -- creation of the BND.

Mixed with this intensity was. I thought, a personal insecurity that reflected itself in a demonstrable need for recognition -- a Geltungsbeduerfniss. Gehlen loved to chalk up intelligence firsts - - even at the cost of some embellishment and exaggeration. There was in him a touch of the spy story romanticist. At times this got him into some difficulties. There was an enormous contradiction in his fascination with dramatic and counterespionage cases with a political angle and the duller business of timely, sustained and in depth management to the security of his organization. I think it is fair to observe that Felfe seemed to recognize and succeeded in exploiting this characteristic.

Gehlen found himself in 1947 with an operating field organization that Baun had built. Baun regarded it as his half of the fifty-fifty


deal he thought he had made. Gehlen pushed ahead, firing Baun. Gehlen may have thought he could bring the field organization under control. He never stopped to deal with basic security problems he had inherited until near catastrophe struck with the KGB and East German orchestrated an expose of his vulnerabilities. The anticipated legalization on 1 April 1953 slipped to 1954 and then to 1955. By then the US Army, having found that Bonn was moving toward a GIS rather than a G-2 that the US Army might dominate tried to derail the whole Gehlen operation. The Army was strengthened in this effort by its ability to charge Gehlen with too many losses in East Germany. The Army had a point but they were ignoring larger issues. In 1954 and 1955 it was too late to go back and face the neglect of problems that had their roots in the earlier postwar circumstances. All western services at that time were paying the price for mistakes in the late forties. But Gehlen did not have time. Getting over the legalization hurdle was his immediate aim. So with characteristic intensity he pushed ahead, papering over and kicking under the rug some problems while building from strength on others. When CIA's Office of Special Operations bought a lot of enemy controlled Eastern European and Russian operations in the early 1950s, the Director of Central Intelligence was not faced with losing all. Gehlen still had not official status. What he did have, was a fully developed service with all of the parts. His evaluation staff was arguably as good as any in the world with Soviet conventional order of battle still the centerpiece. His communications intelligence effort had grown

steadily with far more help from the Americans than he probably understood and would never acknowledge. By 1955 Gehlen had a bureau of codes and cyphers meticulously, and quite illegally -- under the occupation rules -- developed over the years.

Moreover, Gehlen had liaison arrangements with all of the Western intelligence services who, one by one, had signalled the support of their governments to support the move of the Gehlen Organization into the frame of an official BND. In those critical months leading up to the act of creating the BND, Gehlen battened down the hatches and simply overpowered the opposition and offered Bonn a central intelligence service with all of its parts and one that had the full support of the evolving German military establishment. The final act was taken on 22 February 1956 and is reflected in a single sentence decision in a Cabinet meeting: "Es wird eine Nachrichtendienst eingerichtet. Er wurde dem Bundeskanzleramt angegliedert." Gehlen had landed his boat in Bonn. Along the way it had served a lot of purposes, among them as a lifeboat and safe haven for what little remained of the German General Staff. What was emerging was a German national security system designed specifically and prepared over a decade to fit smoothly into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I think that was the intention of Reinhard Gehlen from the first. The bottom line was that Gehlen had a dream and with enormous intensity of purpose may it come true.

INSERT EXTRACT FROM GEHLEN STUDY FOR SIBERT

1946



THE SCOPE AND CHARACTER OF GEHLEN'S AMBITIONS AFTER WW II

There is in the record a statement of Graf von Kielmannsegg, allegedly made at the height of the controversy over remilitarization policy in 1950 that Gehlen's goal was domination, i.e. die Oberung, of the future defense ministry. I did not find this too surp[ri]sing in that context since several of my closest associates in the CIA staff in Pullach argued at the height of the 1950 struggle for power among the German generals, that Gehlen aspired to be a "latter day Von Seekt" saving the German General STaff for another day. The fact is that the facility, funds and organization centered in Pullach became a kind of life raft, a safe haven and a remarkably well suited institution that supported in divers ways the strategy of three generals who organized and prepared themselves as a nucleus of a future German Bundeweher just at the moment in history when American policies were moving in the same direction. The Americans who established Operation Rusty at Oberuersel in 1945 did not plan it that way. At the request and insistence of the Pentagon in 1947 and again in 1948, CIA took over Operation Rusty with no commitment beyond taking a more thorough look at a large and complex operation. CIA's first decision was to identify the operation more accurately as the "Gehlen Organization" since his personal influence and decided to was really because of his dominant role.the Gehlen Organization

and was already a fairly full-blown national intelligence service. In 1948, still under the United States Army in Germany, the character changed with a significant influx of former German General Staff officers, including Adolf Heusinger, the veteran operations chief from the Eastern Front. CIA assumed responsibility on 1 July 1949 when General Lucius Clay, who after 1947 was both Military Governor and the senior military commander. Clay delayed the transfer to CIA until his departure set for 1 July 1949. All that had happened after 15 March 1947 had happened on Clay's watch in Germany as both Military Governor and CINC USFET. But I have never seen any evidence that he recognized what was going on. I have seen no record of either his interest in or a visit to Pullach. Adolf Heusinger made no secret of what he was up to and clearly saw himself as moving with the times. In the first four months as the CIA officer in charge in Pullach, I came to understand quite well what the three generals were doing and planned to do. In late 1949 they were mainly telling other German officers to sit down and be quiet until the West asked Germany to rearm. Most of them did must that. Until the Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel, nobody in Washington show any interest in my tale of three generals. By then, they were ahead of changing times.

Gehlen had not changed his objective at all. His eye was firmly focused on his aim to build a German intelligence service. But he recognized the advantage of moving forward in lock-step with the three generals to ensure that the two efforts would be

mutually supporting in advising the future Chancellor on these import elements of a national security system. And that is the way it worked out although it took roughly six years to get all of the pieces in place. After May 1945 Gehlen never again donned a uniform and I never saw any evidence he intended to do so.

The events of 1950 moved Chancellor Adenauer and his Cabinet rapidly forward to some significant and quite far reaching decision on the character and make-up of the future Bundeswehr and the former army, navy and air force officers who would form the senior cadre for the new forces. Gehlen's involvement in the events of 1950 were ,mainly a strong reaction to the Graf Schwerin episode, with what seemed obviously British support, to hastily assemble a quasi-official German intelligence group in the Bundeskanzleramt, Gehlen's reaction was in part his anger with what he perceived to be indifference and an unwillingness of CIA and the American High Commissioner to become actively engaged. As it turned out, American intention was not needed.

Schwerin disappeared from the scene. Gehlen, through a connection with Dr. Hans Globke, a new face in the Bundeskanzleramt in mid-summer 1950, established direct contact with the Chancellor himself and was in a position to provide very close intelligence support to the BKA and to the military planners at and following Himmerode. But except for

these intelligence actions, Gehlen played no direct role in the Chancellor's moves on remilitarization. During 195 Gehlen at times believe that history was passing him by and passed through a severe crisis of confidence in his own future and his relations with the Americans. By the year end Gehlen was moderately encouraged by signals he received from Adenauer.. By the end of 1950, intelligence an remilitarization developments had clearly separated.

The events in 1950, which I have described as "The Year of Decision" erased any doubts I might of had about Gehlen's role in drafting the blue-print for the new Bundeswehr and Germany's eventual entry into NATO and the Western European Union. Gehlen had clearly made a decision in early 1948 to provide a temporary supporting structure for the three generals that were preparing themselves to advise the future German government on the whole question of a German role in the defense of Europe. Heusinger, as head of the evaluation staff in Pullach had a supporting facility and staff that was a factor in the preparedness of the three generals to move in the summer of 1950.

Gehlen became a party to the conflict with Schwerin only when Schwerin was able to expand his charter to include intelligence -- an effort that never got off the ground. He followed closely the dramatic events of that summer of 1950 and assured his future by concurrently supplying Adenauer with timely and precisely tailored intelligence. During 1950 GEhlen in fact despaired that

events were passing him by and that the Americans were providing him no critical political intervention at the moment he perceived a need. CIA simply disagreed with him that Schwerin was more than a passing episode and that any political initiative or precipitate serious discussion of a future German intelligence service would be very premature. This disagreement on timing was to become an almost seasonal issue. American High Commissioner John J. McCloy was prepared in early 1950 to inform Adenauer of our position on supporting the Gehlen Organization and to suggest that perhaps the Chancellor should acquaint himself with Gehlen. That effort failed for reasons that I will get to elsewhere in this book. McCloy remained aloof, with CIA's full agreement, from the entire chain of events in Bonn that started with the British initiative with Schwerin. At the very end of the year, after Schwerin had disappeared from the scene, the High Commissioners took note of the December Brussels discussion on Europe's defense. McCloy indicated his agreement that it was time for defense talks to start. They did on 9 January 1951 at the Petersberg. Heusinger and Speidel were present with Minister Theo Blank.

THE ROCKY ROAD TO GEHLEN'S DREAM -- DER DIENST

Gehlen had taken the essential preparatory steps in the last months of the war. The beginning of the process of building "The Service" was when Captain John Boker walked into the room at

a VIP interrogation center in Weisbaden to find Gehlen asleep on a cot in a room shared with Pastor Niemoeller. For Gehlen, Boker was exactly the right man. He was a tall, distinguished in appearance, a third generation German whose family in New York and in Sollignen in the Ruhr had for many decades produced quality cutlery. Boker spoke fluent Germany and the inaccented English that placed him in New England where he had graduated from Yale. As a wartime intelligence officer Boker had been through Camp Ritchie and at the end of the war was focusing on the realities of American's great wartime ally, the Soviet Union. Boker heard Gehlen's story and with credibility related it to the USFET G-2. The initial decision took no more than a decision to round up at Oberuersel the group of German officers who two months earlier had ended four years of looking at the Soviet Order of Battle as their main occupation and to recover and ask, by the Fremde Heere Ost files -- both steps that the USFET G-2 would, in any case, have pursued. In that initial exchange, Gehlen also included on his proposal, the reassembling of Lieutenant Colonel Herman Baun and a cadre from an Abwehr organization that had collected Soviet intelligence provided to Gehlen's Fremde Heere Ost. That seems to be as far as Gehlen got before G-2 in the Pentagon in Washington ordered that the capture head of Fremde Heere Ost and a half dozen of his aides, all named in the message, be immediately sent to the United States for extended interrogation under the immediate supervision of the Pentagon. On 30 July 1945, the Gehlen group were flown to Washington and moved into Camp 1142. *Gehlen's

window of opportunity in Weisbaden with John Boker and the USFET G-2 had closed.

It was Gehlen's good luck that he encountered John Boker in the VIP interrogation center at Wiesbaden in the summer of 1945. A third generation German from the cutlery industry of Sollingen in the Ruhr, Boker was a wartime intelligence officer, a major in 1945, with a reasonably detached view of Germans and Germany and a growing conviction that intelligence on the USSR would shortly be a valuable commodity. Basically, he and Gehlen had a quick meeting of the minds. Boker gave Gehlen the opportunity to register his vision of the future and the role he saw for the survivors of Fremde Heer Ost. At the end of July 1945 Gehlen and a half dozen of his associates were whisked off to Camp 1142 in Virginia for interrogation under more direct control of the G-2 in the Pentagon. There is no evidence that the decision to move Ghelen to the US in July 1945 was in any way related to the fragile deal that Gehlen had made with Boker and his superiors in the Frankfurt area. Indeed, the decision made in Germany had not yet taken on a tangible form that could be described. The fate of Gehlen's plan by August 1945 rested on the understanding he had made with Boker and on two of his wartime associates -- Gerhard Wessel, Gehlen's longtime deputy in FHO and Herman Baun who had not yet been heard from. Eventually Baun turned up in the southern Allgaeu and joined Wessel in the ~Blue House" om Oberuersel.

GBOOK26

REINHARD GEHLEN

Reinhard Gehlen was on a very conventional military career track that carried him through military schools that equipped him for the equally conventional staff assignments that were his wartime record. Essentially he was a bright, well trained and obviously efficient officer of the type that inevitably moved into the conceptualizing and detailed planning of major military operations. His single major experience was as an emerging General Staff officer working for Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder and Chief of Operations Adolf Heusinger. His performance for Heusinger, obviously observed closely over a long period by General Halder. He excelled, in the eyes of his superiors, in planning operations and was effective in _____

_____.--this section was badly
garbled _____

Unbelievable as it may sound, no one had prepared me to meet Reinhard Gehlen. I knew little or nothing about him and no one had offered to inform me. On my arrival in Pullach on a late September morning in 1948 I parked my old black chevrolet on

the cobble stone drive in front of a modestly imposing three story oblong building facing a walled-in court -- at one time the house of Martin Borman. Looking down a cobblestone walk directly opposite the door I could see a green area over which flew an American flag. The only entrance to the building, exactly at its center, was immediately across a curb of sorts perhaps six or eight feet from the front of my wholly unimpressive parked car. As I got out of the car, the door in this entrance opened; I was greeted just outside the door by two men. and his colleague as "Herr Roger." It was the beginning of a one-on-one relationship in the Pullach setting that would last eight years. I say one-on-one because all of the complex developments that were to follow on the German and American, eventually led to another round of the protracted dialogue between the two of us.

He was a man of average stature, lean and trim in appearance with a small mustache and closely cut brown hair. My first impression was of his large, but not protruding, blue eyes set against clear skin drawn tightly over high cheek bones. He introduced himself simply as "Doktor Schneider" By the time I met him in 1948 Reinhard Gehlen knew exactly what he wanted: A sovereign German nation in a Western alliance under the leadership of the United States of America. The new German nation would require a centralized national intelligence service working with other Western intelligence services within the framework of the American led alliance. He believed that, in the postwar circumstances with the world polarizing between the

two superpowers of the Soviet Union and the United States, it would be possible to fully develop such a German service under an American trusteeship that would ultimately be taken over by the new German government with Reinhard Gehlen as the first chief of the service. To Gehlen this was a single concept; he was not willing to settle for half a loaf.

Reinhard Gehlen has often been described, quite correctly, as a German General Staff officer of the old school. He was always formal, impersonally pleasant on most occasions. In eight years of almost daily dialogue and remaining in regular contact for another 25 years when I last met with him on his death bed, I always addressed him, in later years purely out of habit, as "Herr Doktor" and he me as "Herr Marshall" or "Mister Marshall". At times we had disagreements on issues that Gehlen saw as critical to his entire design. Word would circulate within the organization that there had been a real clash between us. The fact is that neither Gehlen nor I ever raised our voices once. When things became too difficult, I would detect an icing over of his blue eyes as he carefully steered the meeting to an end. He would push his chair back from the coffee table the separated us and bring both hands, palms down, with slightly more force than usual and formally and pleasantly take his leave. With equal iciness he would sometime make concessions in agreeing to some request or proposal of mine by lifting both hands, palms up, and with almost jaunty pleasantness say "Why not!" He would then formally and graciously take his leave.

In the early years we often met in his office. In some ways I preferred this; it afforded opportunities to observe and sometimes chat with his immediate entourage. Also, the two-story house also served as the residence for his wife, Herta, and five children. When I arrived in Pullach Colonel Philp made available to me a small office in a building comparatively remote from the Borman Haus the cobblestone square that was the center of activity. It was only after some years that his principal assistance and I agreed on the necessity for getting Gehlen's family out of the compound. Burton Hersch in his book "The Old Boys" reports that Allen Dulles personally gave Gehlen a gift of \$250,000 with which he purchased a villa on Lake Starnberg. The fact is that we were running a small Savings and Loan operation to provide employees with "Schlüssel Geld" and small loans to get them out of the compound and leading more normal lives. Gehlen's very modest wooden-frame house on a road leading down to the east bank of Lake Starnberg was purchased for DM 48,000. Gehlen committed much of his then DM 3,000 salary to repayment. In later years, Gehlen ordered a small pre-fab house that was put up in back of the original house. There, in very small quarters, he and Herta shared his last days. Gehlen's son, a technical expert within the BND, had occupied the main house.

I would describe Reinhard Gehlen as an aesthete with few interests beyond his work and no visible vices beyond a consuming appreciation for good cigars. He always accepted a

cup of good coffee and invariably put three teaspoonsof sugar in a moderate size cup. After the coffee,the lighting up of cigars became a ritual. Gehlen would unwrap the cigar, clip the ends with meticulous care, light up, produce the first cloud of exhaled cigar smoke with obvious enjoyment and then sit back. It was time to talk. On social occasions at his home wine was served and desert was followed by excellent liqueurs. I do not recall having seen Gehlen consume stronger alcoholic drinks. But he made no point of others who did.

Material possessions seemed to play almost no role in the years in Nikolaus Caserne. Gehlen was always provided with a chauffeured Mercedes of a more modest model, most green or black as I recall. In the early years he travelled mainly by car. When his presence in Bonn became a factor, he quietly boarded the sleeper out of Munch which delivered on at Bad Godesgburghof in early morning. I have no recollection of bodyguard or security vehicle accompanying Gehlen. One morning in the late years of my stay in Pullach, Gehlen arrived at the compound with what appeared to be a bullet hole in the windshield.This incident occurred on the road in from Starnberg near the wooded location of the Bavarian Rod and Gun club. Gehlen did not make much of this and I so not recall the results of a police forensic examination.

In all of the years at Pullach, Gehlen observed my birthday by sending a secretary into a Munich store to get buy a gift. I have

a metal ashtray, a copper single candleholder holder that for years adorned a wall in my beach house on the Outer Banks of North Carolina where much of this book was written. Gehlen was an amateur photographer with a standard Leica. I recall how pleased he was when I gave him a photographer's shoulder-strap carrying case from the PX.

Also, I do not think that Gehlen ever took a vacation, alone or with his family, in all the years that I knew him.

I do not believe that Reinhard Gehlen had friends. I never heard him refer to anyone as a "friend" and never perceived of his relationship with anyone that could in conventional terms be described as a close "friend." Gehlen saw other individuals in terms of where they fitted into his professional world or in his family. He was very much the traditional German head of family. He spent a surprising amount of time with his children and was blessed with a strong, intelligent, gracious and supportive wife. Gehlen's 70th birthday was celebrated in the modest house in Starnberg with his extended family present.

Gehlen surrounded himself in the WW II years in Fremde Heere Ost with career officers, many like himself elevated into the German General Staff. But he also built a solid team of officers and enlisted specialists who framed the backbone of his wartime team and, to an amazing extent, formed the solid professional basis of the organization that emerged as the BND. I think

Gehlen viewed all of these as "good colleagues" rather than "good friends." There was simply no space, no logical setting and no framework for simply "friends." That is not to say that he was not highly loyal to his associates and the record speaks for itself that he maintained the loyalty and conscience of his associates through difficult times.

Along with the concept of loyalty-up and loyalty-down that prevailed in his organization, Gehlen succeeded more because of his singleness of purpose and amazing persistence than because of any great gift as either an intelligence professional or a student of politics as an art. Gehlen's approach to creating his organization and engineering its gradual acceptance in the political body of postwar Germany was a remarkable and carefully designed long-term strategy that reflected a demonstrated ability to estimate the broad forces that would shape the future. If Gehlen had live to see the collapse of the Soviet Empire as a power and international communism as an ideology he would have been forced, along with a lot of other warriors of the Cold War, to reassess his own, probably exaggerated, estimates of the threat to the free world. Gehlen rather thought of himself as one of the few that really saw how dangerous communism really was and the possibility, or even the probability, that Soviet Communism might have some major successes in the West in his lifetime. His passionate cause had been destroyed by the communists themselves.

During the seven weeks between my arrival and my reporting to Washington I met almost daily with Gehlen, usually with not more than one of his staff, almost always Heinz Danko Herre. Gehlen had an enormous problem that complicated our relationship from the first. He saw himself as the German head of a German intelligence organization in a defeated and occupied Germany. He was dependent on the Americans for everything. He knew from the first that the extent to which the Americans extended knowledge and control would make it more difficult for him to have credibility in his reassurance to his German coworkers on the German character of the organization. But, more important, he would need credibility in assurances to a future Chancellor and Parliament that his was a German intelligence service serving Germany's national interest. On the other hand, he recognized that the US Government was asking questions: Who are these people? How much do we know about them? What are they doing? How well are they doing and how much will it cost? Is it conceivable that a future sovereign German government would really accept Gehlen and his organization -- lock, stock and barrel -- as its national intelligence service?

On 31 March 1956 I would, entirely alone, gaze out the window immediately above that door and watch the lowering together in for the last time, in this former facility of the Nazi party, the Stars and Stripes and the flag of the new sovereign German state. Late that evening I gathered my remaining personal papers

and quietly got in my car parked immediately opposite that same front door and left that cobblestone courtyard as I had arrived, alone, unescorted and driving my own car. On 1 April 1956 the German flag alone was raised over the headquarters of the new Bundesnachrichtendienst, the central intelligence service of a now sovereign West Germany that was carrying its full share of a NATO led by the United States of America. Reinhard Gehlen had achieved entirely and comprehensively his goal that had been fully explained to me on my first visit in September 1948.

My mission on arrival in Pullach in 1948 was less impressive than Gehlen's view of the future. I was to take a good look at operation "Rusty" and to recommend whether it or any of its parts should be salvaged and distributed around the US intelligence elements in Germany, whether it should be continued as it was or, alternatively, whether it should wholly be dismantled. Also, I was to address whether CIA should assume responsibilities for any part or all of it. I was given no hint of any Agency existing preference for any of these solutions. In the single discussion of "Rusty" among senior CIA officers in Germany I had detected a negative consensus; not one of these new colleagues of mine wanted to have any involvement of any kind with CIA's ordered investigation. And there was no mention by anyone of any existing commitments by the US military sponsors to anyone in "Rusty" and certainly no inkling of a "Gentlemen's Agreement" between General Dewing Sibert and Reinhard Gehlen in the late summer of 1946. I had held responsible intelligence staff

positions in both Germany and Austria between 1946 and early 1948 and was aware that an operation called "Rusty" was being run out of the US Detention and Interrogation Center at Oberuerse making some use of former German intelligence officers. We had no reason to believe that it was of any real significance.

While looking into Rusty, I had been left responsible for another reasonably demanding mission -- directing a developing intelligence effort against our allies, the Soviet, by coincidence centered in Munich on the other side of town. I was offered no staff support and the daily pouches from Washington contained no background data or further guidance on how to approach my task. This did not suggest to me that the powers in Washington were really all that interested in "Rusty." Nevertheless, I decided to get on with my added responsibility with the aim of having a single brief report in Washington by the end of December -- the deadline in my instructions. In the end, I put it alltogether in a single 1900 word cable.

It would be almost accurate to say that the US Army was supplying Gehlen with rations, quarters, some transportation and very little money. Generous to a fault with cases of cigarettes and wholesale shipments of coffee beans, the Army gave the German organization an unblinking green light to survive in the black market. Once a month, a bag containing \$125,000 in US currency was delivered to Pullach. It was promptly moved by the

German moneymen to Berlin where it brought the highest rate of exchange for the new

German Deutschemark. American occupation authorities were also providing the minimum cover documentation to make it possible for Gehlen's people to get about their business without too much harassment from occupation authorities in the American, British and French zones of Germany and Austria. Since Austria was run directly out of Washington and was not part of either the European Command or the Office of Military Government in Germany, life was not easy for Gehlen's operators and agents in Austria. Nor were the British and French sympathetic to secretive German intelligence operators careening about their zones. Doktor Schneider, of course, maintained a position of aloofness from all of this. But his administrative staff could not. Over money, the black market and poor cover, Gehlen's relationship with the US military in the summer of 1948 was passing from crisis to crisis -- all at the top levels of the three services intelligence staffs as well as with the US Eucom intelligence chief in Berlin -- Air Force Major General Bill Hall. The Army G-2 in Heidelberg and the Air Force A-2 in Wiesbaden maintained substantive liaison with Gehlen's analysis staff in Pullach and were recipients of both the formal distribution of reports from Gehlen and a stream of informal reporting in response to ad hoc requirements through these service substance-oriented liaison officers. It is likely that the Pentagon was getting mixed signals from Germany: (1) The German leaders of "Rusty" are complaining bitterly about the character

of support they are getting. (2) Tension over the posture and strength of Soviet forces in East Germany are rising and production from Rusty is critical. General Clay's famous message in 1948 warning of a possible Soviet attack had, of course, reached Washington about four months before my mission Pullach. For Gehlen, a favorable wind was blowing out of the East.

Gehlen obviously attached importance to my visit. Although I was announced as simply another visitor, a Mr. Marshall, from the Pentagon, Gehlen and his immediate staff seemed to have zeroed in on the facts and gave me their undivided attention. Gehlen was desperate for an association with the new CIA. My only assistant was a CIA officer named Jay Carlton who was also my #2 in Englischergartern trying valiantly to keep our very unilateral CIA effort there going. So most of my meetings with Gehlen and members of his organization were alone. Sometimes I was accompanied by Eric Waldman who alone appeared to have a deep interest and insight to their operations and future. Eric Waldman was a Viennese Catholic Jew, an immigrant from Austria. A wartime military intelligence officer, he had met Gehlen and his half dozen principal aides from Fremde Heere Ost when they were under in depth interrogation at Camp 1142 outside of Washington. Waldman was a sensible, sensitive and highly intelligent officer. Sometime during the course of my investigation Colonel Schow, the Army G-2 in Heidelberg conveyed to me the opinion that Waldman was too close to the

Germans and was to be reassigned. As far as I was able to observe, Waldman was primarily guilty of ability to converse fluently in German and politically sensitive. I liked Waldman and certainly benefitted when he accompanied me on visit to field offices of the organization. I did not, however, include him in most of my conversations with Gehlen.

The Pullach kaserne was a well-defined, fenced in secure area under requisition and control of the American occupation authorities. Administratively it was part of the Munich Military Post. The operation may have been named for him when Colonel "Rusty" Philp was the senior officer at Obveruersel when the operation was launched. In Pullach, a Bavarian Village, he was a sub-post commander of the 7821 Composite Group which included perhaps ten officers and as many as 15 enlisted men. It administratively ran the Pullach compound. All of this was cover and pro forma. But with it came numerous advantages and support at a level that could be attributed to Colonel Philp seniority, a WW I enlisted contemporary and subordinate of First Sergeant Clarence Huebner -- in 1948 a three-star general commanding all US Army troops in Germany.

Gehlen was clearly interested to know who I was and what my credentials were to have this mission that was so vital to him. From day one it became obvious that his immediate staff were tasked to dig into my background. The Army colonel in charge at Pullach was almost sixty and a contemporary and friend of

General Huebner, the US Army commander in Germany. His predecessor had also been a senior colonel in his fifties. How old is Marshall? What experience has he had? Are we being taken seriously? Is sending us this young guy a brush off?

one of the earliest and most costly lessons learned. But the Americans, the French and the British were, again and again, to turn up shocking KGB successes.

Quite apart from this vulnerability due to divided Germany, Gehlen had not been mending the store. From the outset he had paid a price by using trusted military colleagues of the Old School where intelligence professionals were needed. Gehlen's wartime experience as head of Fremde Heere Ost had prepared him admirably to understand the character of a centralized intelligence effort with extremely professional analysts and evaluators. Wartime agent operations employed to collect intelligence behind enemy lines were not part of Gehlen's personal wartime experience. He relied on the work of such specialists as Herman Baun, for years as a member of the Abwehr and, in the last months as nominally a part of the RSHA Amt VI. Mainly Gehlen relied on communications intelligence, monitoring of Soviet military circuits, and on front-line information collected by the major commands on the entire eastern front. At time, air reconnaissance played an important role. Gehlen, particularly in the early years, got poor marks from many of my CIA colleagues for lack of good tradecraft. Gehlen also deserves some criticism for his lack of attention to the vulnerabilities that could come with a permissive attitude and careless attention to the political background of his employees. But this misses the point. Where Gehlen really fell short was that his control of operations, right out into the field organizations,

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Gehlen

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did not give enough attention to the security of operations. The damage done to Gehlen from the Felfe operation because of Felfe's SD background was minimal. The real cost was in the results of Felfe being a controlled Soviet agent: the compromise, arrest, imprisonment and in some cases the death of agents in East Germany. But beyond the loss of agents and a demoralization of his own organization, the Felfe case almost wrecked Gehlen's systematic effort to form the first postwar German service.

Gehlen

Gehlen's main interest in counterespionage, or III-F in parlance of the old Abwehr, was spelled out in a paper done in the early 1950s called "Moderne III-F Dienst" authored by Dr. @ Klausner, head of Gehlen counterintelligence staff in which Felfe eventually found his niche. Klausner's theory was that along the lines of espionage and counterespionage between two intelligence organizations there are vital opportunities for handling successful espionage penetrations, as well as double- and triple-agent operations, in ways that will make the channel a significant political action access that can influence high levels of government. I felt at the time that Dr. Klausner was stating what Gehlen wanted to hear. It reflected what I perceived to be a reasonable discussion of Gehlen's attitude. If I am correct in this observation, it explains to some extent why Gehlen was vulnerable to the kind of operations that Felfe was able to develop as "Doktor operations." Almost every senior intelligence officer I have known has relished the opportunity to take by hand

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add to his image as the sophisticated founder of the BND. "Verschlusssache" -- a direct attack on the Ostpolit of the SPD -- was published posthumously and was allegedly not written by Gehlen although it was not an inaccurate version of his opinion that communist subversion in the West was gaining ground *because of Willi Brandt's "Ostpolitik"*

In the last chapters in his book, Gehlen displayed an apparent obsession in his late years with the danger of a communist victory over the West and depicted himself and his colleagues as unique in understanding the communist danger. This is, of course, a possibly unfair criticism made with the hindsight of the collapse of the Communist Empire which came as a surprise to most of the world. It is my opinion that Gehlen must be viewed in context of the entire quarter century that he dominated German intelligence -- in the best and worst of this remarkable record. I have not been easy on Gehlen but I think I have been fair and given history a complete picture as seen by an American who shared these times with him.

PART II -- THE LEGACY OF ADOLF HEUSINGER

Reese
Boon
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CHAPTER THIRTY SIX

THE LEGACIES OF REINHARD GEHLEN AND ADOLF HEUSINGER

PART I -- THE LEGACY OF REINHARD GEHLEN

REINHARD GEHLEN

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Gehlen was an intelligent man but not an intellectual. He was most accurately described as "immer sachlich" -- a man who gets right to the point. He was pragmatic and interested in the facts. Reinhard Gehlen ^{conveyed the image of} ~~was a~~ moral man with Christian beliefs ^{an image} that were evident and reenforced by his wife Herta, their four children -- Katharina, Christoph, Marie-Therese and Dorothee, ~~and his extended family~~. By 1943, with the end of Hitler's Third Reich in sight, he knew where he wanted to go and had his own ideas on how to get there. Colonel Lutz, a close associate, described Gehlen as lacking in charisma but talented at creating esprit in his organization, I observed him to have an aversion to involvement in difficult management problems and wholly disinclined to select and assign authority to a ^{principal} deputy. He surrounded himself with a variety of individuals, "Z.b.V", and assigned to each tasks of some purpose and interest to ^{himself} ~~him~~ ^{Gehlen}. This management tendency was equally apparent in his

conveyed
an image

Principal

older, senior and not fully employed
 use of ~~older~~ ^{older, senior and not fully employed} ~~unemployed~~ associates to "study" identified management problems on which he was unprepared to act. He seemed uncomfortable with wide exposure or contact with employees and seemed to use "security" as a reason for avoiding contacts. He rarely made visits to field organizations. At times he demonstrated an inability to make wise and careful judgments; these were most often related to decisions on individuals with a visible potential to do damage to the organization. Many of Gehlen's problems in late years stemmed from personnel matters in which Gehlen had or should have had the definitive voice.

described as
 Gehlen was the wholly dominant personality in Pullach ^{and in} ~~and in~~ my report to Washington in 1948. I referred to the operation as "the Gehlen Organization," ^{which gradually gained} ~~which gradually gained~~ widespread acceptance and usage in intelligence circles. I think that Gehlen, an obscure one-star general in the last year of the war, had a touch of insecurity with a modest need for recognition that had been only partially met by his cover name "Doktor Schneider." He seemed to enjoy this ^{sudden fame} ~~sudden fame~~ of "the Gehlen Organization" while cultivating the image of a man of mystery under dark glasses, snap-brim hats and an aura of secrecy regarding his movements.

Germany's "Master Spy"

Those of us who saw much of him did not think of Reinhard Gehlen as "A Legend in His Time", a "Man of Mystery" or the "Spy of the Century"; Gehlen had a consummate fascination

with the work of the spy and as head of German intelligence staff a conventional intelligence officer
 1942 Gehlen had no experience with the work of the spy and as head of German intelligence staff a conventional intelligence officer

for political matters, whether in Bonn or within the intricacies of an elaborate ^{downright counterespionage} CE operation reaching into the political levels of communist regimes. Like many intelligence officers of his era, he had developed a theory that elaborate political operations could be played out along the communications lines of counterespionage operations; Felfe was a classic case.

For almost eight years I occupied an office separated from his by a cobblestone courtyard no more than ^{distance} 150 feet wide. We were in continuing, at times daily, contact. There was never any difference between us on the larger purpose that had brought us together. Looking back over these fifty years since I met Gehlen I can say that mostly we were in agreement on the direction we were going but, ^{but our roles in Mitelburg were separate} at times -- and particularly in the first two difficult years -- we had disagreements on how to get from here to there. Our relations were always civil, correct and impersonal. Neither of us ever raised his voice, used profanity or walked out of a meeting. When we differed on something of importance, each stated his position and then began the search for a compromise -- an exercise in which his and my associates were often involved. Our relations in my last year in Pullach were adversely complicated and marred by a belated US Army G-2 effort to destroy Gehlen's organization. But he never confronted me squarely with his suspicions of my complicity in the Army G-2 operations against him; he left ~~that~~ to his subordinates

~~Edward Tamm~~

was not, I think, ever told of the Tamm Smith fact in 1954 or 1955.

Footnote
in July 49
understand

including Herre, Blum and Kuehle in who ^{at the time} failed in their efforts to convince him that he was wrong, ^{he} acknowledged that he had been wrong only ^{12 years later} when he retired. At the times that we differed I found that I felt no rancor or anger but largely interest and curiosity about what he was doing and why he was doing it. Through all the ups and downs, our relations outside of the office and with ^{our} ~~his~~ family ¹² were always congenial. After his death I maintained ties with Herta Gehlen, a poised woman of aristocratic background; she was presiding graciously and with much apparent happiness over her extended family that remained centered in Berg just above the east bank of Lake Starnberg. I think she was a ^{as the matriarch of the family} great moral force in the Gehlen family and remained healthy and very active in the Evangelical Church right up until her peaceful death one night in 1993. To this day, I have maintained ties to all four of Gehlen's children for whom I feel a genuine affection. ^{on the occasion of a visit to Munich in June 1988, 2 shared a large lunch} ^{land was all for at which 2 told me} ^{at some lunch of my visit of their father} Gehlen's relations with his immediate associates was not close; the word "friend" was not a part of his vocabulary. I never heard him speak of any of those who shared the war and postwar experiences with him as anything but "kollegen" and "mitarbeitern" -- colleagues and co-workers. But I think he regarded Eric Waldman and probably John Boker as "friends" - - possibly because they were Americans and outside of his professional world. By some curious process I think I made the transition in Gehlen's mind later in life to become an

*an agreement
when came to regard him. He
trust, all relations. He
actually addressed
me once as an*

"old friend." This change was first apparent at the time of his 70th birthday party at which his lifelong assistant, Annelore Krueger, and I were the only guests outside of his extended family. This warmth was evident in my late visits to his home and, above all, in my last visit in 1979 when I found him very ill. After a half hour of sporadic conversation, I told him good^gbye^g and turned to Herta Gehlen sitting in a chair at the foot of the bed, saying I thought I should leave. With his eyes still closed, Gehlen reached out to me with a frail hand and said in German, ~~"Warte."~~ "Wait." After a minute or two, he opened his eyes, turned his face toward me and with some difficulty he spoke: "Before you go, I want to thank you for helping me achieve the dream of my life, the service." That was the last time I saw Gehlen. It left no doubt in my mind about his priorities. Several days later I received a message while travelling in the Middle East that Gehlen had died.

GEHLEN'S INTELLIGENCE LEGACY

The central fact is that Gehlen built a modern, well organized centralized intelligence service that was responsible to the chancellor, under oversight of the Bundestag and, at the time, supported by Dr. Kurt Schumaker, head of the opposition SPD. Organizationally it looked much like the Central Intelligence Agency; but actually Gehlen had quite independently arrived at the same conclusions on

national intelligence that had guided the United States in creating CIA. The principles and concepts that governed the design and creation of the BND remain, I have found, remarkably intact more than four decades later. The BND has lived within the political and philosophical boundaries of a firmly democratic German society and state that dates back to the decade that followed WW II. Like all intelligence services in this era, it has been politicized to some degree while maintaining its essential independent character.

Gehlen was uniquely qualified to play the part in history that he did. His experience on Halder's General Staff in the Western European offensive in 1940 and his participation starting in October 1940 with Heusinger in planning Barbarossa -- interrupted by a hastily organized attack into the Balkans, Greece and Crete in early 1941 -- had stretched Gehlen's mind to think of the war in geopolitical terms. As head of Fremde Heere Ost he had come to a conclusion about what the world would look like after the end of the war. The unconditional surrender terms would leave Germany divided and occupied by the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. There were other officers in the Army General Staff, including General Adolf Heusinger, who had gone that far in their thinking about the end of the war; but it was only Gehlen who saw in Fremde Heere Ost a card that could be played at the end of the war as the first step toward building a bridge to the West in an anti-Bolshevist

alliance defending Western Europe. I can attribute to no other former German officer the vision, determination and practical political skill that he demonstrated in sticking to his guns in that turbulent decade that began in the last days of the war. But there were limitations on Gehlen's ability to play out his role that created precarious circumstances in the years before the founding of the BND and clouded his image and reputation in his later years.

A NATIONALIST WHO BELIEVED IN THE GERMAN NATION STATE

Gehlen was a German nationalist and, ^{in postwar Europe,} ~~after the war,~~ a Gaullist. He attached great importance to the existence and preservation of Germany as a European nation state. He consistently told the Americans on whom he relied for support that the integrity and German character of his organization must be preserved if he were to steer a course toward its destination in a restored German nation state allied with the West. Like Adenauer, he saw a future in a United States of Europe in which the rapprochement between France and Germany as nation states would be central. It would be a Western Europe with independence under a strategic canopy maintained by the United States as a nuclear and maritime power. He moved urgently to establish postwar relations with France, Italy and Spain with Switzerland a fortunately preserved neutral nation that could provide a common meeting ground in postwar Europe and

many services to all. His earliest postwar liaison was with the Swiss Federal Police. Establishing relations with the smaller Western European nations came easily; but on relations with the British he was unsure and delayed establishing contact.

GEHLEN'S WARINESS OF THE BRITISH

Gehlen was wary of the British intentions in his postwar Europe. Britain was not a European nation state but was too close to avoid being drawn into Europe in peace or war. He was aware of the character of the "special relationship" that had evolved out of the US and UK battle against German U boats for control of the Atlantic and North Sea. This "special relationship" acquired a different character after successes at GCHQ in reading German military and diplomatic communications encoded by the Germans using the Enigma machine; the product became the ULTRA intelligence shared by the British and Americans. In my early years in Pullach, Gehlen was preoccupied with suspected interlocking conspiracies of the Soviets and the British; ^{he saw} both, for different reasons, ^{to be} ~~were~~ intent on the destruction of the US-sponsored Gehlen Organization. The defections of Philby, Burgess and McLean did not help. Gehlen remained aloof from liaison with the British until the Federal Government was firmly in place and legalization of the Gehlen Organization seemed likely in early 1953. By then, Gehlen had decided

that the special relationship between the US and the UK could not be replaced by a competing connection between the Americans and his own developing service. The American-British relationship was at the heart of the NATO alliance to which Chancellor Adenauer and his military advisors were determined to add German armed forces. Gehlen had left the door open for a West European solution. Besides, Gehlen by late 1954 was developing some ambivalence about the Americans.

AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE RESPONSIBLE TO A GERMAN NATION STATE

After 1950 Gehlen had assumed the survival of Germany as a sovereign nation state with a national intelligence service that would serve Germany's national interests. His relations with the Americans and the British would remain close and within the evolving NATO alliance; but most of his other liaison arrangements would be those of a sovereign nation state with wide interests beyond Europe and the NATO area. France showed no inclination to be anything less than a French nation state. This had been, from his first contacts with the French in 1948, what Gehlen had anticipated. Speidel's reports from his French connections confirmed this opinion. I think Gehlen was, from the beginning, a convinced Gaullist and remained so to the end. But in the years 1950 to 1954, being a Gaullist fitted very well with the US policy on European defense that was so vigorously pursued by

McCloy, Eisenhower and the State Department right up to the collapse of the EDC. It had reluctantly been supported by Adenauer until August 1954; his eyes had remained firmly fixed, after 1950, on NATO. It would be years later that he would return to close ties with De Gaulle.

GEHLEN'S EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE GERMAN CHARACTER OF HIS ORGANIZATION

Gehlen acknowledged to me at our initial meeting that denial of true name data on his organization was his established policy and had not been challenged by the Army G-2 in Germany. When I prepared to close my briefcase and leave, he agreed to provide me, as a first step, a list of all persons in supervisory positions in headquarters and his field organizations. In time, we learned all that CIA needed to know to make decisions. Because virtually all the files of the Hitler era, including those of German intelligence, were in allied hands, I did not take Gehlen's early references to "a German organization" seriously. But this tendency on the part of Gehlen did contribute to my 1948 recommendation that CIA go no farther than agreement to take over the operation, to provide support at no more than the existing level of the Army's support and, with an adequate US staff, to spend perhaps two years taking a careful look at the Gehlen Organization before making any decision on US long-term policy on German intelligence.

< insert 49 agreement)

But Gehlen never abandoned his principle of preserving the German character of the organization and ^{some elements of his staff} secrecy of his staff and operations. He pursued this policy and paid a price for doing so. He made it difficult for us to be helpful in limiting KGB, East German and even American CIC penetrations. I think Gehlen found it psychologically difficult to trust others on matters he viewed as national security. Fortunately, much of his top staff recognized the importance of achieving an atmosphere of mutual trust and found ways of cooperating in matters of staff and operational security. I later concluded that Gehlen's position on this issue was partly political posturing but did leave its mark on the history of his organization and the early years of the BND. In fairness to Gehlen I would note that we found openness and cooperation of his organization incomparably better than that of our own US CIC in Germany over the same years.

Being by nature a convinced German nationalist and later a Gaullist had influenced Gehlen's perception of his relations with American intelligence. Gehlen had given no thought to any kind of integration of the developing German service into American intelligence -- an idea actually proposed ^{to Gehlen} by General Sibert prior to his return to the United States in the late summer of 1946. Also, Gehlen opposed all suggestions coming from his opponents in Bonn that his organization be contributed to a "G-2 at Fountainebleau" as a

Western European service. The Americans in Germany did very little to utilize CIC and other US intelligence capabilities to provide the Gehlen Organization with counterintelligence protection. Gehlen's conception that the rescued Fremde Heere Ost would remain in character a German organization under his direction was a concept that subtly influenced his relations with the Americans but may have been a positive influence on the morale and sense of dignity and independence of his associates. It was possibly also a confidence-building policy in seeking legalization and acceptance from a sovereign government in Bonn.

GEHLEN AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM

Gehlen was in no sense a Nazi;

Gehlen as a young officer led an existence remote and protected from the Nazi Party. As a developing GSC officer in the time of Beck, the General Staff lived a life quite separate from the Party. The isolation continued under Halder -- particularly after the move to East Prussia; (the question of Gehlen joining the Party never confronted him.)

He never came close to being one of "Hitler's Generals."

Gehlen's image in postwar history suffers from the fact that he seemed to have left no record of his views on National

By nature a very private and uncommunicative man
Socialism. He rarely touched on this subject in conversations with me. He had not actively identified with the Resistance, saw it as flawed and unlikely to achieve its purpose. He had little in common with the 20th of July

"A"

circle that became much in evidence in Bonn in the early 1950s. Gehlen had embarked ^{in 1943} on his own conspiracy but one that assumed the war would run its course ending much as it did. I accepted at face value the statements of Eric Waldman ^{in the Blue House or Oval Office} that there were no Nazis at Oberursel or in the early times in Pullach. But it is clear that Gehlen tolerated members of the Geheime Feldpolizei and, mostly after 1950, ^{a number of} ~~at least a~~ dozen former SD officers ^{who strengthened} ~~beefed up~~ his countersubversion effort centered in Karlsruhe. It is my opinion that most of Gehlen's serious problems, including Felfe and Clemens, stemmed from his decisions to compromise in crossing the line in employing intelligence and security officers with politically objectionable pasts in the Hitler era. These were simply unwise and unnecessary risks. The fact that many elements of state and federal government in Germany went further than Gehlen in rehabilitating competent officials with Nazi-tainted pasts is mostly ignored by those who choose to detract from Gehlen's contribution to the peace and stability that all of Western Europe has enjoyed for a half century.

Many of Gehlen's closest and oldest associates say that Gehlen should have retired within a few years after the founding of the BND. But this ignores the fact that the Felfe case was a ticking bomb that was not exposed until 1961 and that the "Spiegel Affair" followed. The publishing of his memoirs, "Der Dienst", after his retirement did not